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The United States is in the middle of three profound energy 
revolutions—with booming production of renewable power, natural 
gas, and oil. The country is replacing coal power with renewable and 
natural gas power, reducing pollution while saving consumers money. 
And it has dramatically cut its oil imports while becoming, for the first 
time in half a century, an important oil exporter. The United States is 
on the cusp of an energy transformation that will provide immense 
economic and environmental benefits.  
 
This new energy economy will require massive investment in energy 
transport—especially power lines to bring wind and solar power to 
market and gas pipelines to back up these renewable sources. But 
increased interest from overlapping jurisdictions in energy transport 
approvals has resulted in delays and uncertainty that make private 
companies wary of long-term capital investments in new energy 
facilities. The drive for more careful and holistic environmental 
assessments of new energy facilities has also repeatedly delayed new 
infrastructure. And land-owners and property rights groups are 
increasingly asking the courts to curtail the use of eminent domain by 
pipeline and power-line companies. 
 
This Article develops a unified scholarly and policy approach to these 
high-profile threats to energy transport investment. Although most often 
discussed in the context of controversial oil pipelines, these threats are 
actually a far greater danger to investment in cleaner power sources 
like wind, gas, and solar. At this pivotal moment, this Article describes 
how reforming energy infrastructure reviews can lower the cost of 
investment in a new energy economy while accommodating increased 
public interest in pipelines and power-lines. It proposes legislation to 
ensure a comprehensive, thorough, and unified approval process for 
energy transport projects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is in the middle of three profound energy revolutions. 
First, the falling cost of wind and solar power have made these sources the 
cheapest options in many parts of the country. Second, directional drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing—or “fracking”—has unlocked new reserves of low-cost, 
clean-burning natural gas from shale formations, and this gas is now powering 
new gas power plants that can easily back-up intermittent sources like wind and 
solar power. Third, fracking has also dramatically increased production of oil, 
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making the United States the world’s biggest petroleum producer and, for the 
first time in decades, an important oil exporter. 
Each of these three revolutions is creating a pressing need for long-distance 
energy transport, and every new project costs billions of dollars. Wind power is 
cheapest in the prairie states and needs long-distance power lines to carry it to 
the urban centers that need power in the Southeast and West Coast. Natural gas 
is expensive to transport because it is a gas: it must either be sent by air-tight 
steel pipelines buried in the ground or be sent to massive facilities that can cool 
it until it becomes a liquid and loaded onto specialized tankers for shipment by 
sea. Oil is the easiest to transport of these three commodities because it is a 
liquid, so it can be moved by pipeline, barge, or rail—but even an interstate oil 
pipeline costs billions of dollars. 
Energy transport policy is undergoing similar upheavals. Increased public 
interest in climate, infrastructure, and energy issues has put increasing pressure 
on the established system for approving energy transport projects. The federal 
government has, at times, pushed for a larger role in considering proposals for 
oil pipelines and power transmission, which traditionally have been assessed by 
the states. Some states have pushed for a role in regulating interstate natural gas 
pipelines, which are traditionally under federal regulation. Native American 
groups have pushed for a larger role in approving infrastructure that could 
impact their historical homelands—which go beyond reservation lands to cover 
nearly all of the United States. Land owners have asked state and federal courts 
to limit the use of eminent domain for pipelines and power lines. And climate 
activists increasingly demand that governments and courts impose expanded 
environmental reviews and new substantive standards on energy transport 
projects to ensure they do not endanger the globe. 
These simultaneous energy market and energy policy revolutions are on a 
collision course: just as U.S. energy markets are demanding massive new 
investments in power and fuel transport, changing U.S. energy policy is making 
investors wary. Multi-billion-dollar investments in power lines, pipelines, and 
liquefied natural gas facilities will only pay off over decades. Even the work 
necessary to submit an application for energy transport—entering transport 
contracts, securing easements, applying for government approvals, and 
purchasing equipment and materials—often costs billions of dollars.1 The larger 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, TransCanada Corp. v. United States, at 1–2, 27 (2016) 
(requesting more than $15 billion in damages and noting that the company had already spent 
billions of dollars because “before construction can begin, it is necessary, for example, to 
secure thousands of land easements, purchase equipment and hundreds of miles of pipe, and 
enter into long-term contracts with shippers to transport their oil” and that transport 
companies cannot “wait for the issuance of a permit to begin this long lead time work 
because, under State Department rules, if construction of a pipeline does not begin within 
five years after a permit is issued, the permit expires”); Licia Corbella, Editorial: Death of 
Petronas LNG Project a Wake-up Call for Canada, CALGARY HERALD (July 27, 2017), 
http://calgaryherald.com/business/energy/editorial-death-of-petronas-lng-project-a-wake-
up-call-for-canada [https://perma.cc/5DWM-PLKV] (noting that cancelled liquefied natural 
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the risk that a project will not be approved, or that policies will artificially lower 
its profits in coming years, the more money investors must be paid to 
compensate for this uncertainty. Consumers ultimately pay these higher costs. 
They pay a larger risk premium to investors willing to build energy transport. 
Or, if investors shy away from these investments, consumers forgo the benefits 
of cheaper oil, gas, and renewable power that they would otherwise receive. 
This Article seeks to avoid a collision of these energy market and energy 
policy upheavals, advocating principles that can accommodate increased 
interest in energy policy while, at the same time, providing increased certainty 
to energy transport investors. Uniquely, it addresses energy transport as a 
whole—it shows how power-lines, pipelines, and other energy transport 
methods are similarly impacted by cross-cutting questions of federalism, 
eminent domain, and environmental assessment. In braiding together strands in 
the existing energy law literature, it demonstrates the necessity of a broader 
perspective. For example, climate campaigners often take a “kitchen sink” 
approach to pipeline litigation: arguing for any procedural or substantive rule 
that can stop new fossil fuel infrastructure. This Article’s comprehensive 
approach shows how new procedures developed in these pipeline battles will 
also slow the new power transmission that is necessary to transition the United 
States to a low carbon economy. By revealing the internal architecture of energy 
transport law, this article serves as a blueprint for all parties interested in 
changing the U.S. energy system, demonstrating which supporting policies may 
be safely removed, and which cannot be altered without damage to the rest of 
the system.  
Part II explains how booming production of U.S. renewable power, natural 
gas, and oil is creating a pressing need for more power lines and pipelines. Part 
III documents how procedures for approving energy transport infrastructure are 
changing as a result of pressure from the federal government, states, groups, and 
land owners. It shows how these procedures are common to pipelines, power 
lines, and other methods of energy transport—showing how pressures on one 
type of transport inevitably affect other modes of transport. It concludes by 
showing why climate campaigners would be better served by pursuing 
substantive regulations that would surgically target fossil fuels rather than 
imposing new energy transport procedures that will have collateral impacts on 
renewable power transmission. In doing so, it explores the complex distinctions 
between substantive, cross-cutting, and procedural energy transport laws, 
showing which laws should be targeted by those who want to transform the U.S. 
energy system. 
                                                                                                                     
gas (LNG) project spent $400 million moving through “federal and provincial regulatory 
processes” and billions securing natural gas reserves). See generally James W. Coleman, 
Energy Market and Policy Revolutions: Regulatory Process and the Cost of Capital, in 5 
ENERGY L. & ECON. 159 (Klaus Mathis & Bruce R. Huber eds., 2018) (discussing the various 
difficulties with obtaining approval for energy transport infrastructure and their associated 
costs). 
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Part IV explains how these changing procedures are increasing uncertainty 
for energy transport investors, raising prices for energy consumers, and 
endangering U.S. efforts to create a new energy economy. This Part also 
explains how this uncertainty is particularly deadly to efforts to lower U.S. 
greenhouse gas emissions because high-carbon sources like oil may be able to 
get by using makeshift transport methods such as rail, road, and water transport, 
whereas renewable power absolutely must have long-term transport 
infrastructure. A central irony of energy systems is that our dirtiest sources, coal 
and oil, are easiest to transport, and our cleanest sources, gas and renewables, 
are most dependent on expensive long-term infrastructure. Thus, a myopic focus 
on oil pipelines can be dangerous: the oil industry will be fine whether or not 
new energy transport is built but the renewable industry is almost entirely 
dependent on this infrastructure. 
With the growing problem defined, Part V advocates four principles that 
can help accommodate increased interest in energy transport while, at the same 
time, increasing certainty for energy investors. It labels the first principle “wide 
participation, one decision-maker,” recommending that states go further to 
ensure that federal interests are represented in state approval procedures and 
vice versa, but counseling against a dual-approval process that would increase 
uncertainty by allowing re-litigation of issues already decided in one forum. The 
second principle is that energy transport approval processes should not change 
mid-stream after an application is made. The third principle is that applications 
for energy transport facilities should be subject to timelines that could motivate 
reasonably prompt actions from decision-makers. The fourth principle is that 
the federal government should use its expertise to perform more general policy 
studies of U.S. energy markets, producing studies on the environmental impacts 
of different fuels and the compatibility of increased infrastructure with energy 
and climate goals; these studies could inform individual permit decisions from 
state and federal decision-makers. Part VI concludes the Article. 
 
II. THREE ENERGY MARKET REVOLUTIONS: RENEWABLE POWER, 
NATURAL GAS, AND OIL 
 
The United States has always been an energy superpower: through the first 
half of the twentieth century it was responsible for over half of the world’s oil 
production, powering the Allies through the two World Wars.2 Although the 
United States became a net energy importer in 1953,3 it remained among the 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Rob Bracken et al., The Oil Age: World Oil Production 1859-2050, PLACES & 
SPACES (2006), http://scimaps.org/mapdetail/the_oil_age_world_oi_73 [https://perma.cc/X5 
PF-PGP8]. See generally DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, 
AND POWER (1991) (explaining the origins of the oil and gas boom in early 20th century 
Texas and the development of the United States as the world’s first energy superpower). 
 3 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 18 (2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf [https://perma.cc/BF5C-QB2T]  
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world’s top three oil producers along with the U.S.S.R. and Saudi Arabia.4 But 
in recent years, U.S. innovation has moved it to the forefront of energy 
production across multiple categories: it is now the world’s largest producer of 
wind power,5 petroleum (oil and other liquids),6 and natural gas.7 Cheaper 
renewable power and shale oil and gas have transformed U.S. energy markets 
and are creating a pressing need for new energy transport. 
A. The Renewable Revolution 
In the last ten years, the U.S. 
power sector has been 
transformed by the falling cost 
of renewable power sources like 
solar and wind. Wind and solar 
power, supported by state 
policies and federal tax credits, 
now produce electricity at costs 
that are competitive with 
conventional sources of power 
                                                                                                                     
[hereinafter EIA OUTLOOK 2017] (“The United States has been a net energy importer since 
1953, but declining energy imports and growing energy exports make the United States a net 
energy exporter by 2026 in the Reference case projection.”). 
 4 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2007 xxxiv (2007), 
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038407.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YL8-
XZKU] (“From 1974 through 1991, the former U.S.S.R. was the world’s leading crude oil 
producer. After 1991, Saudi Arabia was the top producer until 2006 when Russia’s 
production exceeded Saudi Arabia’s for the first time. U.S. production peaked in 1970 but 
still ranked third in 2007.”). 
 5 Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, U.S. Number One in the World in Wind 
Energy Production (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.awea.org/MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx? 
ItemNumber=8463 [https://perma.cc/T7SW-DCGR] (“Wind produced over 190 million 
megawatt-hours (MWh) in the U.S. last year . . . . China is close behind the U.S. at 185.1 
million MWh and followed by third-place Germany at 84.6 MWh. Although China has 
nearly double the installed wind power capacity as the U.S., strong wind resources and 
production-based U.S. policy have helped build some of the most productive wind farms in 
the world.”). 
 6 Linda Doman, United States Remains the World’s Top Producer of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Hydrocarbons, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31532 [https://perma.cc/8J4E-JSXG]  
(noting that although Russia and Saudi Arabia sometimes surpass U.S crude oil production, 
the U.S. has a clear lead in “petroleum” production, which accounts for production of lease 
condensate as well as crude oil). 
 7 Id. 
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generation.8 Even without any subsidies, wind power is now on average the 
cheapest source of new power across a windy triangle of the United States 
extending from North Dakota to Illinois to the Texas panhandle.9 In the 
meantime, there are large desert areas in California, Arizona, and Nevada where 
solar is the cheapest power source.10 As a result, most investment in new 
capacity for power production has been in renewable sources like wind and solar 
power.11 
This good news raises a question: if a zero-emission source of electricity, 
with no fuel costs, is the cheapest source of power in wide swaths of the country, 
why not simply transition to an all renewable economy? There are two 
fundamental difficulties. First, the regions where renewable power and solar 
power are the cheapest options tend to be the least populated portions of the 
United States: wind is strongest on the lone prairie and sun is strongest in areas 
that are literally desert.12 If solar and wind are going to power the U.S. grid, it 
will take a massive build-out of power transmission to bring that power to the 
urban centers where power is actually consumed.13 And that is exactly what 
                                                                                                                     
 8 EIA OUTLOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 86; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED 
COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2017 1 (2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_ 
generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEQ9-8CG7] [hereinafter EIA LEVELIZED 2017] (“For 
technologies such as solar and wind generation that have no fuel costs and relatively small 
variable O&M costs, LCOE changes in rough proportion to the estimated capital cost of 
generation capacity.”). There are, however, important caveats. Id at 3 (noting, for example, 
that it “includes the impacts of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), state-level renewable electricity 
requirements as of November 2016, and an extension and phase-out of federal tax credits for 
renewable generation”). 
 9 Joshua D. Rhodes et al., New U.S. Power Costs: By County, with Environmental 
Externalities, in THE FULL COST OF ELECTRICITY, U. TEX. ENERGY INST. 11, 17 fig.8 (2016), 
https://energy.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/UTAustin_FCe_LCOE_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C3XE-PKZ8] (using figures, including the map shown above, to depict the 
minimum cost technology for each county across the United States). 
 10 Id. at 17. 
 11 EIA OUTLOOK 2017, supra note 3, at 85. 
 12 See Rhodes et al., supra note 9, at 11, 17. See generally Ashley C. Brown & Jim 
Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolving Notions of the ‘Public 
Interest’ in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 706 (2010) 
(discussing the difficulties associated with using renewable sources of energy in populous 
areas).  
 13 This may lead to a further energy transport revolution in which direct current (DC) 
transmission lines are used rather than traditional alternating current (AC) lines because DC 
transmission is more efficient for long-distance one-way electricity transport. Alexandra B. 
Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1111 & n.196 (2013) (“Today, new, 
high-voltage DC (“HVDC”) lines are often proposed as the most efficient and economical 
method of transporting wind power long distances.”). 
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utilities are planning: they believe they will smash investment records by 
investing over $22 billion dollars in power transport in 2017.14 
Second, the power grid must constantly balance the power provided to the 
grid with the power demanded by consumers—every light switched on, every 
phone plugged in, every cycle of the dishwasher.15 If either too much or too 
little power is supplied to the grid, electrical devices will fail in homes and 
workplaces everywhere.16 Grid managers are accustomed to avoiding such 
problems by ordering more or less power from power plants across the grid to 
manage fluctuations in demand.17 This challenge becomes more difficult when 
using power supplies that also fluctuate uncontrollably, and the wind and sun 
only provide power when the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. 
There are several ways to integrate more cheap and clean renewable power 
into the grid. The most plausible options will require more capital investment in 
energy transmission and each of these options will have to be pursued 
simultaneously if the United States wants a timely transition toward renewable 
sources. First, long-range inter-regional transmission can help smooth local 
fluctuations in renewable power—when it is cloudy and still in one region, it 
may be sunny and windy in another region that could be connected by 
transmission.18 Second, renewable sources can be paired with natural gas power 
plants that can easily ramp up and down to ensure that power supply matches 
demand, but that will require a huge build-out in natural gas pipelines.19  
Third, renewable sources can be paired with facilities that can store power. 
At the moment, 98% of these facilities use what is known as “pumped hydro,” 
where excess electricity can be used to pump water from a lower reservoir to a 
higher reservoir and then can be released back to the lower reservoir to create 
                                                                                                                     
 14 EDISON ELECTRIC INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A GLANCE v (2016), 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/Trans_Project_lowres_bookm
arked.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XLN-UL7J]. 
 15 See EIA LEVELIZED 2017, supra note 8, at 2 (“Since load must be balanced on a 
continuous basis, units whose output can be varied to follow demand (dispatchable 
technologies) generally have more value to a system than less flexible units (non-
dispatchable technologies), or those whose operation is tied to the availability of an 
intermittent resource.”). 
 16 See id. 
 17 Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 595–96 
(2018); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 293 & n.115 (2017).  
 18 Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1, 44–52 (2014); Herman K. Trabish, Why Aren’t Those Wind Turbines Turning?, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-
arent-those-wind-turbines-turning#gs.GlGzFNk [https://perma.cc/5XX5-7YJS] (describing 
why wind generators must sometimes be “curtailed”—producing no energy even when wind 
is strongest—because of the lack of power transmission). 
 19 See infra Part II.B; James W. Coleman & Sarah Marie Jordaan, Clearing the Air: 
How Canadian LNG Exports Could Help Meet World Greenhouse Gas Reduction Goals, 
C.D. HOWE INST., E-BRIEF 2 (2016), https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/research_papers/mixed/e-brief_244.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD94-4PGJ]. 
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electricity when it is needed.20 But these pumped hydro facilities are also limited 
to certain locations: they are most economical where there is suitable terrain, 
limited evaporation and wildlife, and ideally, pre-existing hydropower or, at 
least, reservoirs.21 As a result, these facilities are, if anything, more 
geographically constrained than solar and wind power.22 And transitioning to a 
low carbon economy will require massive investments in new storage facilities 
and transmission from storage locations to the urban grids that demand power.23 
To support a move to pure renewable power, studies suggest that the United 
States would need over 2,500 Gigawatts of power storage, more than twice the 
country’s current generation capacity.24 Currently the United States has 22 
Gigawatts of power storage capacity—less than 1% of what is needed.25 No one 
has yet estimated the massive scale of transmission required to connect that 
much pumped hydro, dispersed across the country, to power grids that need 
electricity storage. 
The power industry already attracts more capital investment than any other 
U.S. industry.26 Just to maintain the current level of service, it will need another 
                                                                                                                     
 20 John Roach, For Storing Electricity, Utilities Are Turning to Pumped Hydro, YALE 
ENV’T 360 (Nov. 24, 2015), http://e360.yale.edu/features/for_storing_electricity_utilities_ 
are_turning_to_pumped_hydro [https://perma.cc/822F-HYZR] (“[P]umped storage  
hydropower is still the only one [method of power storage] that is mature, reliable, proven, 
and commercially available . . . .”). The next biggest sources of power storage are 
compressed air energy storage, where air is pumped underground and then released when 
power is needed, and thermal storage, where excess electricity is used to produce heat or 
cold that can be stored in insulation and used when necessary. IMRE GYUK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, GRID ENERGY STORAGE 11 (2013), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/09/ 
f18/Grid%20Energy%20Storage%20December%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4JA- 
TB35]. Battery storage is a distant fourth. Id.  
 21 Pumped Storage Provides Grid Reliability Even with Net Generation Loss, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (July 8, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detade.php?id=11991 [https://perma.cc/A3QW-BCF9] [hereinafter EIA, Pumped 
Storage] (showing location of pumped hydro plants in the United States). 
 22 See id.  
 23 Other options for moving to a low carbon economy, such as nuclear power or carbon 
capture, would also require massive capital investments. Edward S. Rubin et al., Cost and 
Performance of Fossil Fuel Power Plants with CO΍ Capture and Storage, 35 ENERGY POL. 
4444, 4444 (2007); Georg Woite, Capital Investment Costs of Nuclear Power Plants, 20  
INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY BULLETIN 11, 12–13 (1978), https://www.iaea.org/sites/ 
default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull20-1/20104781123.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4C5G-XDBQ].  
 24 Christopher T. M. Clack et al., Evaluation of a Proposal for Reliable Low-Cost Grid 
Power with 100% Wind, Water, and Solar, 114 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6722, 6724 
(2017), http://www.pnas.org/content/114/26/6722.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ATZ-6YGS] 
(noting that a study suggesting that the United States could rely on 100% renewable power 
“assumes a total of 2,604 GW of storage charging capacity, more than double the entire 
current capacity of all power plants in the United States”). 
 25 EIA, Pumped Storage, supra note 21. 
 26 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 401 (2012) (“Electric power is a classically long-term business. A power 
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trillion dollars of investment.27 Transitioning to a low-carbon economy will 
require even more investment to transmit power from dispersed renewable 
resources, integrate power storage, and provide natural gas transport and storage 
to back-up these variable sources of power. 
B. The Natural Gas Revolution 
In the past decade, directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have 
transformed global natural gas markets. Fracking has unlocked increased 
production in formations like the Marcellus Shale, which is centered in 
Pennsylvania, and the Barnett Shale in Texas.28 And wells in formations that 
are generally known for oil production, such as the Bakken Shale in North 
Dakota and the Eagle Ford in Texas, are also producing more gas along with the 
oil extracted, inevitably increasing U.S. gas production.29 
Increased production of natural gas has crashed natural gas prices across 
much of North America: prices for producers fell more than 80% from July 2008 
to May 2012.30 Natural gas prices are especially subject to price swings because 
it is so expensive to transport a gas.31 Solids like coal can be transported in 
almost any container—even an open railroad car. Liquids like oil can also be 
transported in many vessels, including trucks, rails, barges, and tankers. But gas 
                                                                                                                     
plant built today may be operating 60 to 70 years from now. It is also a big-ticket business—
in fact, it is the most capital-intensive major industry in the United States. Fully 10 percent 
of all capital investment in the United States is embedded in the power plants, transmission 
lines, substations, poles, and wires that altogether make up the power infrastructure.”). 
 27 Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review 
for Interstate Coordination, 100 MINN. L. REV. 129, 140–41 (2015) (“The U.S. electric grid 
constitutes an $876 billion asset managed by over 3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million 
customers.”). Id. at 142 (“[I]n order to maintain even current levels of grid reliability, the 
electric industry must make . . . investments in transmission and distribution alone of nearly 
$900 billion.”). 
 28 See James W. Coleman, Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1357, 1364–65 (2014) [hereinafter Coleman, Importing]; Thomas W. Merrill & David 
M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water 
Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 153–54 (2013); Fenner L. 
Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio: The Failures of the Dormant Mineral Act, Its Heroic 
Interpretations, and Grave Choices Facing the Supreme Court, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 435, 436–
38 (2015). 
 29 See Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1366–67. 
 30 See id. at 1364; U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 
12, 2018), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm [https://perma.cc/F3PX-CBML]. 
 31 See James W. Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About Gas Prices & Oil 
Production, ENERGY CENT. (July 17, 2014), http://theenergycollective.com/energylawprof/ 
432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-oil-production [https://perma.cc/VAR3-EUTA] 
[hereinafter Coleman, Shale] (“Increased production of natural gas has had a dramatic effect 
on natural gas prices because natural gas is hard to transport. If you can’t send natural gas 
by an existing pipeline to an existing market, your next best option may be to cool it into a 
liquid at í162 °C, load the liquid onto a giant, insulated, quarter-billion dollar vessel and 
ship it across the ocean, where it can be regasified and burned.”). 
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can only be transported with expensive air-tight, and sometimes refrigerated 
vessels.32 So if coal or oil is more expensive in one region than another, 
companies can simply ship these fuels to the place where it is worth more until 
prices equalize.33 On the other hand, when there is a local increase in gas 
production, it must all be used locally even if there is little need to burn more 
gas in the immediate area until transport can be built to carry it to markets where 
gas is desperately needed.34 This is why natural gas prices around the world can 
vary by orders of magnitude, whereas the price of oil, which is cheaper to 
transport, differs only by percentage points across the globe.35 
As a result, fracking and new gas production have opened up wide natural 
gas price differentials around the world. Even markets in close proximity can 
have very different gas prices if there is not enough transport capacity to serve 
the demand in the high cost market: for example, while Pennsylvania and Texas 
have the cheapest natural gas in the world, nearby markets in Massachusetts and 
Mexico at times pay the world’s highest prices for natural gas.36 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1018 
n.68 (1992) (discussing economic peril for gas producers “where gas found cannot be sold 
currently because a pipeline is unavailable and the gas cannot otherwise be marketed”); 
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy 
Price Regulation, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1518 n.169 (1981) (“Gas is not easily stored above 
ground and can be transported only by pipeline. Moreover, gas pipelines require large capital 
investments and can be justified only if the pipeline owner has secure sources of supply 
under long-term gas purchase contracts.”); Nancy J. Forbis, Note, The Shut-In Royalty 
Clause: Balancing the Interests of Lessors and Lessees, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1989) 
(“Natural gas is difficult, if not impossible, to store outside a reservoir, and thus producers 
must either transport gas to a pipeline as it is produced or retain it at the wellhead until they 
can locate a willing purchaser.”).  
 33 See, e.g., Coleman, Shale, supra note 31. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. Renewable energy, of course, faces the same dilemma. Someone is always willing 
to pay for electricity somewhere, but it is often too expensive to transport electricity from 
wind-abundant regions to places where it is needed. So wind and solar farms often receive 
very little for their electricity or even have to pay other parties to take it. Avery Thompson, 
It’s So Windy in Britain That the Price of Electricity Went Negative, POPULAR MECHS. (June 
8, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/a26827/britain-price-of-
electricity-negative/ [https://perma.cc/CV7T-JNZD]; Cassie Werber, California Is Getting 
So Much Power from Solar That Wholesale Electricity Prices Are Turning Negative, 
QUARTZ (Apr. 8, 2017), https://qz.com/953614/california-produced-so-much-power-from-
solar-energy-this-spring-that-wholesale-electricity-prices-turned-negative/ 
[https://perma.cc/6RY3-NDZJ]. There are signs that the same dynamic will gradually impact 
more and more regions as they add renewable power to the grid. A Regional First: New 
Englanders Used Less Grid Electricity Midday Than While They Were Sleeping on April 21, 
ISO NEW ENGLAND: ISO NEWSWIRE (May 3, 2018), 
http://isonewswire.com/updates/2018/5/3/a-regional-first-new-englanders-used-less-grid-
electricity-m.html [https://perma.cc/H9SE-GY5S].  
 36 EIA Staff, December Natural Gas Prices Spike in Boston, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14071 
[https://perma.cc/Y9T4-VGBZ]; Adebola S. Kasumu et al., Country-Level Life Cycle 
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These price differentials have set off a global race to connect new 
production with high gas price markets in Asia and on the U.S. East Coast.37 
The two main methods of moving natural gas—pipeline and ships carrying 
liquefied natural gas—both require billions of dollars of capital investment.38 
                                                                                                                     
Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Liquefied Natural Gas Trade for Electricity 
Generation, 52 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1735, 1739 (2018) (showing a spike in natural gas 
prices in Mexico in mid-2013 from under $5 per million British Thermal Units (MMBTU) 
to over $15 per MMBTU while U.S. Gulf Coast prices remain low); Naureen S. Malik, Cold 
Snap Makes New England the World’s Priciest Gas Market, BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. 
(Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-26/cold-snap-makes-
new-england-the-world-s-priciest-market-for-gas [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal].  
 37 Coleman, Importing, supra note 28, at 1365–66; Merrill & Schizer, supra note 28, at 
153–54. During the decade of peaking natural gas prices, the United States added over 
20,000 miles of natural gas pipelines to connect expanding sources of natural gas production 
with natural gas demand. James Tobin, Major Changes in Natural Gas Transportation 
Capacity, 1998-2008, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 2008), http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas 
/fwd/ngpipelinetc.html [https://perma.cc/4D3N-WHYG] (“More than 20,000 miles of new 
natural gas transmission pipeline, representing more than 97 billion cubic feet per day of 
capacity, were placed in service in the United States over the past 10 years.”). That building 
boom has continued in the new era of natural gas abundance and is only likely to increase. 
And there is every likelihood that the pace of pipeline building will continue as the nation 
moves from coal to natural gas for electricity and heating oil to natural gas for heating. 
Natural Gas Year-in-Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 10, 2012), https://www.eia. 
gov/naturalgas/review/archive/2011/print_version.php [https://perma.cc/7ZU6-HG9S]. In 
the decade of high gas prices, U.S. importers sought to build several new LNG import 
facilities. Clifford Krauss, Exports of American Natural Gas May Fall Short of High Hopes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/05/business/energy-
environment/exports-of-us-gas-may-fall-short-of-high-hopes.html [on file with Ohio State 
Law Journal]. Now, with shale-gas driving U.S. prices below $3 per million BTUs, and 
Asian shale-gas prices over $15, investors have submitted several applications to the 
Department of Energy for new LNG export facilities that could ship to Asia. ERNST & 
YOUNG GLOB. LTD., GLOBAL LNG: WILL NEW DEMAND AND NEW SUPPLY MEAN NEW 
PRICING? 9 (2013) http://www.lngbunkering.org/sites/default/files/2013%20EY%20impact 
%20of%20global%20supply%20patterens%20on%20LNG%20price.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
43AE-J255]. Since 1981, the global LNG trade has doubled every eight years. INT’L GAS 
UNION, WORLD LNG REPORT 2011 7 (2012), https://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-
document-field_file/LNG%20Report%202011.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS44-L8MU]; Knut 
Einar Rosendahl & Eirik Lund Sagen, The Global Natural Gas Market: Will Transport Cost 
Reductions Lead to Lower Prices?, 30 ENERGY J. 17, 17 (2009) (“Over the last decade the 
costs of LNG have been significantly reduced, more producers have entered the gas market 
in general and the LNG market in particular, and the trade between continents has 
increased.”). 
 38 Coleman, Shale, supra note 31 (noting that because of the cost of shipping gas, “when 
natural gas production rises, prices fall quickly because there is little use for the excess gas 
in the markets it can reach. Prices will keep falling until 1) gas is so cheap that energy users 
reliant on alternatives like coal and heating oil switch to gas, 2) gas is so cheap that it can be 
profitably liquefied and sent overseas, or 3) gas is so cheap that it’s no longer worthwhile to 
keep expanding production.”). The U.S. government has repeatedly said that until global 
prices converge, global liquefied natural gas transport will continue to increase. JOHN CONTI, 
2019] PIPELINES & POWER-LINES 275 
Interstate natural gas pipelines must be designed to avoid gas leakage, and 
liquefaction facilities must cool natural gas most of the way to absolute zero 
until the gas turns into a liquid that can be transported on quarter-billion dollar 
refrigerated ships.39 
Apart from the economic imperative to bring new U.S. gas production to 
the markets where it is needed, increased natural gas transport has also been a 
central part of U.S. environmental and geopolitical strategy.40 Compared to 
other fossil fuels like oil and coal, gas burns extremely cleanly, which is why it 
can even be burned inside a home.41 So liquefied natural gas exports could help 
urban areas phase out dirtier fuels like heating oil, and help developing countries 
address their air pollution problems by closing coal plants.42 Natural gas can 
also complement intermittent sources like solar and wind power because, unlike 
other power sources, it can ramp up to meet demand when those sources do not 
provide enough power.43 Finally, better natural gas transport would mitigate one 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECT OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS EXPORTS ON DOMESTIC 
ENERGY MARKETS 3 (2012), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/MGJ6-3TRS] (“Unlike the oil market, current natural gas markets are not 
integrated globally. In today’s markets, natural gas prices span a range from $0.75 per 
million British thermal units (MMBtu) in Saudi Arabia to $4 per MMBtu in the United States 
and $16 per MMBtu in Asian markets that rely on LNG imports. Prices in European markets, 
which reflect a mix of spot prices and contract prices with some indexation to oil, fall 
between U.S [sic] and Asian prices.”). 
 39 Jacob Dweck et al., Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Litigation After the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005: State Powers in LNG Terminal Siting, 27 ENERGY L.J. 473, 473 (2006) 
(“Transporting natural gas very long distances from gas fields located in regions of the world 
with little or nonexistent consuming markets across the oceans to large consuming markets 
is made feasible by chilling the gas to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point the 
natural gas changes to a liquid state, reducing its volume to 1/600th that of vaporous natural 
gas.”). Absolute zero is almost exactly minus 460ÛF. Sarah Zielinski, Absolute Zero: Why Is 
a Negative Number Called Absolute Zero?, SMITHSONIAN (Jan. 1, 2008),  
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/absolute-zero-13930448/ [https://perma.cc/32 
6E-BFVM]. 
 40 Agnia Grigas, Shale Shock: How to Use America's Energy Market as a Foreign 
Policy Tool, NAT’L INT. (Mar. 19, 2017), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/shale-shock-
how-use-americas-energy-market-foreign-policy-19823 [https://perma.cc/V7M2-WD7Q]. 
 41 Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impacts-
of-natural-gas#.WshoHdPwZjs [https://perma.cc/6QQV-NADH] (“Cleaner burning than 
other fossil fuels, the combustion of natural gas produces negligible amounts of sulfur, 
mercury, and particulates.”). 
 42 Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 19, at 2. 
 43 Id. (“Unlike solar and wind power, natural gas plants can be run at any time on 
demand. Such plants even work well with solar and wind because they are easy to ramp up 
or down to match power demand by supplementing the intermittent power these renewable 
sources provide.”). Fast-ramping gas plants can also increase the value of renewable sources. 
When solar and wind farms sell their power on a grid dominated by nuclear, hydro, or coal 
power, they often fetch a low price because those sources will bid into the market at a very 
low price rather than incur the expense of shutting down intermittently. See Michael 
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negative side effect of the U.S. oil boom—oil from shale formations often is 
accompanied by gas, and if there is no market for that gas, it is simply burned 
off (known as “flaring”), wasting the fuel and emitting greenhouse gases.44 
C. The Oil Revolution 
Directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have also transformed U.S. oil 
production. U.S. oil production nearly doubled in seven years from under 5 
million barrels per day in 2008, to nearly 10 million barrels per day in 2015.45 
And, after a short downturn in 2016, the oil boom is back stronger than ever. 
The United States is now projected to surpass its previous record oil production, 
set in 1970, and is already producing more than 10 million barrels per day.46 
The geographical distribution of North American oil production has also 
shifted dramatically.47 Fracking has created three super-fields, each producing 
over 1 million barrels of crude oil per day. The Permian Basin in western Texas 
and southeastern New Mexico was the first to reach 1 million barrels in 2012 
and has been rising steadily since that time, recently reaching 2.5 million barrels 
per day.48 The Eagle Ford shale in southern Texas was next, hitting 1 million 
barrels per day in 2013.49 The Bakken shale also reached that benchmark in 
                                                                                                                     
Shellenberger, Yes, Solar and Wind Really Do Increase Electricity Prices -- And for 
Inherently Physical Reasons, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/michaelshellenberger/2018/04/25/yes-solar-and-wind-really-do-increase-electricity-prices-
and-for-inherently-physical-reasons/#1e5d2fd17e84 [https://perma.cc/JQ8A-5WWQ]. By 
contrast, a natural gas plant will gladly turn the grid over to renewable sources at somewhat 
higher prices, because the gas plant can ramp down almost costlessly and will save money 
on the natural gas it would otherwise need to purchase to serve demand. Id. 
 44 Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. 
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1009–15 (2015) (describing extensive 
flaring in North Dakota as a result of lack of transport options to bring natural gas to markets 
in need of gas). 
 45 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL (2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPUS2&f=A 
[https://perma.cc/3YQB-T5T6]. 
 46 Jack Perrin & Emily Geary, U.S. Monthly Crude Oil Production Exceeds 10 Million 
Barrels per Day, Highest Since 1970, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34772 [https://perma.cc/MB9Z-JM36]. 
 47 Fenner L. Stewart & Allan Ingelson, Regulating Energy Innovation: US Responses 
to Hydraulic Fracturing, Wastewater Injection and Induced Seismicity, 35 J. ENERGY & NAT. 
RESOURCES 109, 117–18 (2016) (identifying shale formation and corresponding twenty-
eight states of the Lower 48 where they are located). 
 48 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERMIAN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT 
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/archive/2018/12/pdf/permian.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/X3MG-FU8U].  
 49 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EAGLE FORD REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT 
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/eagleford.pdf [https://perma.cc/32U9-
JBP2]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PERMIAN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT 
(2017) https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/eagleford.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZN-
2UWT]. 
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2013.50 As recently as 2010 oil production in North Dakota had been negligible; 
now it is the second-biggest oil producer.51 
The pace of this development is astonishing. After just a few years of 
widespread fracking, each of these fields is now producing more oil than is 
produced in all the fields of oil powers like Libya.52 And Texas’s traditional 
reputation as an oil capital may obscure the scale of the revolution that has 
occurred there: in just four years it went from just over 1 million barrels per day 
of production to over 3.5 million barrels per day. After more than fifty years of 
development, oil superpowers like Kuwait and Nigeria produce 2.5 million 
barrels per day.53 Texas added 2.5 million barrels a day on top of its existing 
production in less than fifty months.54 It now produces more oil than Kuwait 
and Libya combined.55 
Canada has also contributed to the explosion of onshore oil production in 
North America. As recently as 2000, the country produced less than 2 million 
barrels per day of oil.56 But expanding production in Alberta’s oil sands, as well 
                                                                                                                     
 50 U.S. ENERGY INFO, ADMIN., BAKKEN REGION DRILLING PRODUCTIVITY REPORT 
(2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/pdf/bakken.pdf [hereinafter BAKKEN 
PRODUCTIVITY REPORT]. The Bakken shale also extends into portions of Montana and 
Saskatchewan. See Bakken Shale Maps, BAKKEN SHALE, https://bakkenshale.com/maps/ 
 [https://permca.cc/2Z96-BMCA]. 
 51 James Coleman (@energylawprof), Crude Oil Production by State, TWITTER (Mar. 
29, 2018, 8:16 AM), https://twitter.com/EnergyLawProf/status/979376653573947392 
[https://perma.cc/EXV3-UWR7] [hereinafter Crude Oil Production by State]; see also 
BAKKEN PRODUCTIVITY REPORT, supra note 50 (providing more detailed data). 
 52 Salma El Wardany, Libya Oil Output at 4-Year High Loosens OPEC Grip on Supply, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. (July 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
07-02/libya-s-oil-production-said-to-exceed-1-million-barrels-a-day [on file with the Ohio 
State Law Journal]. 
 53 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL, 
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711308&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPKU.A 
[https://perma.cc/24ZE-3ZUZ] [hereinafter CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL]; 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, NIGERIA, ANNUAL,  
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711308&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPNI.A 
[https://perma.cc/NJT7-8DGH]. 
 54 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., TEXAS FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfptx1&f=a 
[https://perma.cc/MBQ7-KLGK] [hereinafter TEXAS FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL]; see 
Crude Oil Production by State, supra note 51 (comparing Texas production with that in other 
states).  
 55 Compare Crude Oil Production by State, supra note 51 (Texas produces over 
4,000,000 barrels per day), with CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, KUWAIT, ANNUAL, supra note 53 
(producing approximately 2,750,000 barrels per day), and U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, LIBYA, ANNUAL, https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category 
=1039874&sdid=STEO.COPR_LY.A [https://perma.cc/M223-XJDC] (producing  
approximately 897,000 barrels per day). 
 56 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, CANADA, ANNUAL 
https://www.eia.gov/opendata/qb.php?category=711309&sdid=TOTAL.PAPRPCN.A 
[https://perma.cc/TS5M-WDW9]. 
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as fracking in Alberta and Saskatchewan, have doubled Canadian production, 
which now stands at 4 million barrels per day, not including offshore production 
in Eastern Canada.57 
This onshore oil boom has scrambled oil transport markets, which for 
decades were designed to carry oil into the center of North America. Historically 
the best price for crude was obtained at refineries in the U.S. Midwest near 
Chicago.58 And refineries in Texas took in oil from overseas to slake the thirst 
of fuel markets in the South and Southeast.59 Now a flood of oil must travel the 
other way, from Alberta, North Dakota, and Texas to parts of the country, and 
parts of the world, that have not been part of the fracking boom.60  
This new oil geography has led to a boom in pipeline proposals designed to 
take oil from the center of the continent to the coasts, which is where most U.S. 
refineries are located.61 While infamous pipelines like Keystone XL and Dakota 
Access attracted controversy, numerous other pipelines and pipeline expansions 
were approved and built, bringing oil south toward the coast.62 But these 
proposals have not been able to keep up with the flood of crude: large volumes 
                                                                                                                     
 57 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CRUDE OIL FORECAST, MARKETS AND 
TRANSPORTATION 4 (2017), http://www.oscaalberta.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CAPP-
2017-Crude-Oil-Forecast.pdf [https://perma.cc/94LG-3CYK] [hereinafter CANADIAN 
CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2017]. 
 58 Andrew Leach, The Shifting Flow of Oil, CANADIAN BUS. (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/blogs-and-comment/the-shifting-flow-of-oil/ 
[https://perma.cc/3F7R-PBRY] [hereinafter Leach, Shifting Flow]; Andrew Leach, 
Explaining Canada’s Hurry to Build Pipelines in the U.S., MACLEANS (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.macleans.ca/economy/economicanalysis/explaining-canadas-hurry-to-build-
pipelines-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/N8E7-AZ2Y] [hereinafter Leach, Explaining 
Canada’s Hurry]. 
 59 See Leach, Shifting Flow, supra note 58; Leach, Explaining Canada’s Hurry, supra 
note 58. 
 60 See Leach, Explaining Canada’s Hurry, supra note 58. 
 61 CANADIAN ASS’N OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, CRUDE OIL FORECAST, MARKETS AND 
TRANSPORTATION iii-iv (2015), http://0104.nccdn.net/1_5/06e/17d/2cd/Crude-Oil-Forecast-
-Markets-and-Transportation-Report-June-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXC5-7PKF]  
[hereinafter CANADIAN CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2015]; see CANADIAN CRUDE OIL FORECAST 
2017, supra note 57, at 23; Hannah Breul, Regional Refinery Trends Evolve to Accommodate 
Increased Domestic Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=19591 [https://perma.cc/P3FA-3RYH].  
Once oil reaches the coast, it can also be shipped abroad if prices rise overseas. See Catherine 
Ngai et al., Texas Flood: U.S. Oil Exports Pour into Markets Worldwide, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-oil-record-flows-analysis/texas-flood-u-s- 
oil-exports-pour-into-markets-worldwide-idUSKBN1FS0NP [https://perma.ccYYP7- 
YHEQ]. 
 62 See, e.g., Robert Tuttle, Keystone Left Behind as Canadian Oil Pours into the U.S., 
BLOOMBERG NEWS ENTER. (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20 
14-11-14/keystone-left-behind-as-canadian-oil-pours-into-u-s- [on file with the Ohio State 
Law Journal] (noting construction of Flanagan South and Seaway pipelines); CANADIAN 
CRUDE OIL FORECAST 2015, supra note 61, at iv (noting five significant expansions of 
Enbridge pipelines headed east and south during 2015). 
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of oil are now traveling by rail as well.63 Transporting this oil by pipeline would 
be safer than rail, which can lead to explosions when trains derail.64 
III. ENERGY POLICY REVOLUTIONS: CHANGING PROCEDURES FOR 
APPROVING ENERGY TRANSPORT PROJECTS 
Recent years have seen major upheavals in the process for approving all 
forms of energy transport. This has been driven by four important forces. First, 
as energy issues have grown more contentious, the federal government has 
pushed for an increased role in considering proposed interstate oil pipelines and 
power transmission, which have traditionally been approved by the states. 
Second, on the flip side, some states have asserted a right to block federally-
approved interstate gas pipelines. Third, environmental groups have 
increasingly asked governments and courts to impose expanded consultation 
requirements and environmental reviews on energy transport projects. Fourth, 
land owners have asked federal and state governments to limit eminent domain 
for power-lines and pipelines. 
These four trends have come together most prominently in opposition to oil 
pipeline proposals such as Keystone XL and the Dakota Access Pipeline. But 
even if these moves were developed as a legal strategy to stop fossil fuels65 (or 
                                                                                                                     
 63 Indeed, the ease of transporting oil by other means is one reason that production has 
increased so dramatically—when local production of oil rises dramatically, it can just be 
shipped abroad to places still in need of oil. James Coleman, The Shale ‘Revolution’ Is About 
Gas Prices and Oil Production, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (July 17, 2014), 
http://theenergycollective.com/energylawprof/432466/shale-revolution-about-gas-prices-
oil-production [https://perma.cc/VAR3-EUTA]. Prices will not fall dramatically until world 
demand is saturated. Id. In contrast, because natural gas is so hard to transport, local booms 
in natural gas production often have a drastic impact on local gas prices. Id. 
 64 Crude-by-rail is particularly dangerous for the light and highly flammable crude oil 
unlocked by hydraulic fracturing: in just one incident, a train carrying oil from new oil fields 
in North Dakota derailed in the Canadian town of Lac Mégantic, killing forty-seven people 
in a massive explosion. Grant Robertson, North Dakota’s Explosive Bakken Oil: The Story 
Behind a Troubling Crude, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail. 
com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/north-dakotas-explosive-
bakken-oil-the-story-behind-a-troubling-crude/article16157981/ [https://perma.cc/359K-
6HJD]; U.S. STATE DEP’T, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ES-
12, ES-35 (2014), https://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/221135.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L6UN-T5P3] (estimating transport by rail instead of pipeline could cost oil 
producers “up to $8” extra per barrel of oil transported and that denying the Keystone XL 
pipeline “would result in an estimated 49 additional injuries and six additional 
fatalities . . . on an annual basis” due to increased oil transport by rail); see also Klass & 
Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 974–75 n.172 (discussing other destructive railway accidents 
involving oil transport). 
 65 For a description of how delays to these pipelines impacted oil transport investment, 
see James W. Coleman, Policymaking by Proposal: How Agencies Are Transforming 
Industry Investment Long Before Rules Can Be Tested in Court, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
497, 512–14 (2017). 
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even make cleaner fuels look better by comparison), they will have a serious 
impact on all energy transport projects if they are successful. Federalism, 
environmental assessment, and the rights of indigenous peoples and land owners 
all present cross-cutting issues that are equally applicable to power and fuel 
transport. And there will always be challengers who object to new infrastructure 
because of impacts on local communities, disagreements about the best future 
for the electricity grid, and the environmental impact of energy transport. This 
section demonstrates how these issues cut across modes of energy transport, 
posing the greatest risk to cleaner sources of energy such as renewable power. 
A. Federal Government’s Expanded Role in Interstate Oil and Power 
Transmission 
Approval of interstate powerlines and oil pipelines has historically been left 
to the states crossed by these energy projects.66 That is, if a company wants to 
build a powerline or pipeline from Kansas to Texas, it must get the approval of 
Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma, which lies between the two states.  
In theory, the federal government also has some authority over these 
pipelines because they inevitably cross “navigable waters,” which include 
navigable waters such as rivers as well as some wetlands and other aquatic 
features that are not, in fact, navigable.67 The federal government must grant 
Clean Water Act Section 404 permits for these crossings.68 But, in practice, the 
federal government has left review of these projects to the states, pre-
authorizing water crossings by pipelines and power-lines.69 In 2012, it reissued 
                                                                                                                     
 66 Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 44, at 982–88, 1027–53 (noting varied approaches to 
oil pipeline siting in different states and collecting state statutes). One prominent exception 
is energy transport projects that, like Keystone XL, cross an international border—those have 
historically required a presidential permit under Executive Orders 11423 (1968) and 13337 
(2004). Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12–13, 17, 26 n.13 
(D.D.C. 2013) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against domestic crude oil 
pipeline because it, unlike Keystone XL is “an entirely domestic pipeline”). 
 67 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732, 759 (2006) (ruling by a four-Justice 
plurality that this term only includes “relatively permanent” bodies of water, concurrence 
from Justice Kennedy says this term, instead, refers to waters or wetlands with a “significant 
nexus” with navigable waters); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 133 (1985) (finding the statue also covers wetlands adjacent to navigable waters). 
 68 See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012); Riverside, 474 U.S. at 123. The Congress could also 
pass new laws regulating pipelines and power-lines under its constitutional authority “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes” under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
Although this power is not unlimited, and may not extend to all water bodies, it certainly 
extends to water crossings. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 172–74 (reading “navigable waters” 
in the Clean Water Act not to apply to isolated bodies of water to avoid “significant 
constitutional questions” about whether Congress could regulate such bodies of water). 
 69 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONWIDE PERMIT SUMMARY 12 (2012), 
https://www.spk.usace.army.mil/Portals/12/documents/regulatory/nwp/2012_nwps/2012-
2019] PIPELINES & POWER-LINES 281 
a nationwide general permit that allows energy infrastructure to be built without 
individualized environmental review.70 So in practice the federal government 
has left review of interstate pipelines and powerlines to the states that these 
pipelines cross.71 
This equilibrium was upset when the U.S. government declared that it 
would do a full review of the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline, which 
already had approvals from the states that it would cross: North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Iowa, and Illinois.72 In contrast, to the usual expedited process, the 
pipeline underwent an in-depth environmental assessment and consultation 
process, consuming more than a year and 1,200 pages, which ultimately 
determined that the pipeline would have “no significant impact” on 
environmental or cultural resources.73 This decision meant, however, that the 
pipeline would not have to undergo a full environmental impact statement 
process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which now 
average over five years to complete.74 
Nevertheless, in the waning days of the Obama Administration, the Army 
Corps of Engineers announced it would do a full environmental impact 
statement for the pipeline, announcing that the federal government would take 
a wider role in approving interstate energy infrastructure as part of its 
                                                                                                                     
NWP-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WD7-NXLV] (making no mention of climate change in the 
environmental analysis that accompanies domestic crude pipelines). President Obama even 
specifically streamlined this already minimal process. Press Release, Office of the Press 
Sec’y, Presidential Memorandum—Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from Cushing, 
Oklahoma, to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic Pipeline Infrastructure Projects (Mar. 
22, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/22/presidential-
memorandum-expediting-review-pipeline-projects-cushing-okla [https://perma.cc/L8EQ-
H3YF].  
 70 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, supra note 69. 
 71 On the other hand, the federal government has consistently said that it must approve 
pipelines that would cross international borders, such as the Keystone XL pipeline proposal. 
See Exec. Order No. 11,423, 3 C.F.R. § 742 (1966–1970) (designating the Secretary of State 
as responsible for receiving and considering permits for facilities, including pipelines, that 
cross U.S. borders); Exec. Order No. 13,337, 3 C.F.R. § 165 (2004) (providing special 
instruction to the Secretary of State on how to treat facilities for the “exportation or 
importation of petroleum, petroleum produces, coal, or other fuels”). 
 72 Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to the Commander 
of the U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Proposed Dakota Access Pipeline Crossing at Lake Oahe, 
North Dakota 3–4 (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/459011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QUB-AK5L].  
 73 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MITIGATED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE PROJECT WILLIAMS, MORTON, 
AND EMMONS COUNTIES, NORTH DAKOTA (2016), https://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org/ 
digital/collection/p16021coll7/id/2801 [https://perma.cc/4GFB-W3AL] (then select “Final 
EA” on the right; then click the download button above it). 
 74 Dept. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757–58 (2004) (describing how a 
finding of no significant impact does not require any further Environmental Assessment or 
Environmental Impact Statement). For length of environmental reviews, see infra Part V.C. 
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responsibility to Indian tribes.75 This shift was particularly dramatic because the 
federal government still insisted the pipeline would have “no significant impact” 
on the environment.76  
This new policy was reversed by the incoming Administration and is now 
embroiled in court disputes.77 The district court reviewing the Army Corp’s 
                                                                                                                     
 75 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR REGARDING STANDING 
ROCK SIOUX TRIBE V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-department-justice-department-army-and-
department-interior-regarding-standing [https://perma.cc/26GW-MZXK] (“Furthermore 
this case has highlighted the need for a serious discussion on whether there should be 
nationwide reform with respect to considering tribes’ views on these types of infrastructure 
projects.”); Updates and Frequently Asked Questions: The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s 
Litigation on the Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTHJUSTICE (Nov. 1, 2018), 
http://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standing-rock-litigation [https://perma.cc/V4QT-3HKC] 
(interpreting the government’s joint statement as “call[ing] for a national review of the 
government’s approach to Tribal consultation for major fossil fuel projects”). Just before the 
end of the Obama Administration, in January 2017, the three departments issued a report on 
their review of consultation with tribes on infrastructure decisions. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DEP’T OF THE ARMY & DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, IMPROVING TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND 
TRIBAL INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS (2017) https://www.bia.gov 
/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/pdf/idc2-060030.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE8X-YDDQ]. The 
tribes’ recommendations focused mostly on oil pipelines rather than infrastructure in general. 
See id. at 15, 52, 65 (“Clarify the need to conduct an EIS for crude oil pipeline construction 
and operation. . . . Tribes noted that the most problematic projects reviewed under the NHPA 
involve extractive industries (such as oil, natural gas and mining). . . . Tribes similarly 
opposed the use of Nationwide Permits to authorize major infrastructure projects 
(particularly oil pipelines), which Tribes did not believe sufficiently safeguarded treaty 
rights.”). The departments, however, did not distinguish between different kinds of 
infrastructure projects. See id. at 16–24. 
 76 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 24 
(D.D.C. 2016); see also Memorandum from Jo-Ellen Darcy, supra note 72, at 1, 4 (“On July 
25, 2016, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted a permission to applicant 
Dakota Access, L.L.C., under Section 14 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 408 (Section 408 permission), for a proposed crossing of Lake Oahe, a Corps project on 
the Missouri River. . . . The Section 408 permission was accompanied by an Environmental 
Assessment, as contemplated under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321–4335, and its implementing regulations. . . . The Environmental Assessment 
included a finding that granting the Section 408 permission for the proposed crossing of Lake 
Oahe did not constitute a major Federal action that would have significant environmental 
impacts. . . . [T]his decision does not alter the Army’s position that the Corps’ prior reviews 
and actions have comported with legal requirements.”); Ellen M. Gilmer, Obama Admin 
Denies Final Easement for Pipeline, E&E NEWS (Dec. 4, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/ 
stories/1060046601/ [https://perma.cc/F267-8HYW] (noting some denounced the decision 
as political and urged then-President-elect Trump to reverse it upon assuming office). 
 77 Exhibit 1: Easement for Fuel Carrying Pipeline Right-Of-Way Located on Lake Oahe 
Project, Morton and Emmons Counties, North Dakota, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1-16-cv-1534-JEB). This re-
reversal from the Army Corps was made in response to direction from the new 
Administration. See Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump to the Sec’y of State, the 
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decision ultimately determined that the lengthy environmental assessment 
process had failed to adequately consider the possibility of oil spills and the 
potential impact of the project on cultural resources.78 It remains to be seen 
whether the courts or future administrations will continue to expand the federal 
role in interstate pipeline approvals.79  
At the same time that the federal government was seeking to layer federal 
review on top of state reviews of interstate oil pipelines, it was seeking to 
remove state review of certain power-line projects. Given the abundance of 
wind power in the plains states, and the dearth of renewable power in the 
populous U.S. Southeast, a company, Clean Line Energy Partners, proposed a 
new power-line from Oklahoma, across Arkansas, to Tennessee. Arkansas, 
however, saw little benefit in a new power-line crossing the state to help power 
producers and consumers on either side, and rejected the power line. At this 
point, two federal agencies stepped in—the Department of Energy and the 
Southwestern Power Authority—and partnered with Clean Line Energy 
Partners, preempting Arkansas’s rejection of the power-line. This move by the 
federal government to alter the balance of power in energy federalism was also 
challenged in court, but has since been abandoned.80 
                                                                                                                     
Secy of the Army, and the Secy of the Interior, Presidential Memorandum Regarding 
Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-construction-keystone-xl-
pipeline/ [https://perma.cc/AM4B-3FR4]; see also Plaintiff Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s 
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1–2, Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1-16-cv-
1534-JEB) (arguing the President’s direction for the Army Corps of Engineers to “review 
and approve” the permit was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law”). 
 78 Standing Rock Sioux v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101, 147 
(D.D.C. 2017); see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Pipeline’s Fate Uncertain After Big Legal Victory 
for Tribes, E&E NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056071 
[https://perma.cc/J4U6-B5PM] (discussing the decision, the pipeline’s uncertain future, and 
how a “decision to shut off a pipeline for inadequate environmental review would be 
unprecedented”). 
 79 There are some signs that courts may be willing to overturn the general federal policy 
of minimal review for oil and power transport projects. A federal court in Louisiana recently 
held that the Army Corps’s finding of no significant impact for an oil pipeline was invalid, 
although the decision was subsequently enjoined by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See 
Ellen M. Gilmer, Court Lifts Freeze on Bayou Bridge Project, E&E NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/03/16/stories/1060076547 
[https://perma.cc/P7GK-NWUJ]. This could be seen as part of the general trend since the 
New Deal of moving more areas of American law from state responsibility into the federal 
domain. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & GRANT M. HAYDEN, AMERICAN LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION 136–38 (3d ed. 2017). 
 80 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Downwind v. U.S. Dept. of 
Energy, No. 3:16-cv-00207-JLH (E.D. Ark. filed Aug. 15, 2016) (challenging the 
Department of Energy’s decision to approve the construction and operation of an electronic 
transmission line on due process, statutory authority, sufficient rationale, and improper use 
of eminent domain); Tom Kleckner, Arkansas Landowners Seek to Stop Plains & Eastern 
Clean Line Project, RTO INSIDER (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.rtoinsider.com/arkansas-
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B. State Government’s Expanded Role in Interstate Natural Gas 
Pipelines 
Natural gas pipelines are approved by the federal government, through the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and thus states have traditionally not 
had a significant role in regulating these projects.81 But here too the balance of 
power in energy federalism is under attack as states assert a right to block 
federally-approved projects. Any significant construction project inevitably 
requires numerous state and local construction permits: permits to bring in 
heavy equipment, permits to cross streams, permits to close roads for 
construction. Historically, a federal permit was generally enough to ensure that 
these permits were granted but first Connecticut and now the State of New York 
have decided that they have authority under the U.S. Clean Water Act Section 
401 to deny a state Water Quality Certification to pipelines approved by the 
federal government.82 
In 2016, New York denied a Water Quality Certification to the Constitution 
Pipeline, which was designed to transport natural gas from shale fields in 
Pennsylvania to consumers in New York, and had been approved by the federal 
government in 2014.83 In doing so, New York was following the example of 
Connecticut, which in 2006 denied a water quality certification to the federally-
approved Islander East pipeline.84 New York argued that pipeline construction 
would endanger New York’s water supplies85—a contention not supported by 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.86 Pipeline backers quickly filed 
suit, alleging that the state could not deny water quality permits to a federally 
                                                                                                                     
plains-eastern-clean-line-30539/ [https://perma.cc/48WN-3B3V]; Robert Walton, DOE 
Terminates Partnership With Clean Line Energy Partners, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/doe-terminates-partnership-with-clean-line-energy-
partners/519995/ [https://perma.cc/MKGA-RHWH]. 
 81 See Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717f(c)–(h). 
 82 See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 79 (2d Cir. 
2006). Note that these permits are granted under the federal Clean Water Act, so they are not 
simply preempted by the federal approval. 
 83 Letter from John Ferguson, Chief Permit Adm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. 
Conservation, to Lynda Schubring, Envtl. Project Manager, Constitution Pipeline Co., LLC, 
Water Quality Certification/Notice of Denial (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs 
/administration_pdf/constitutionwc42016.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC9L-C6CX]; Alexandra 
B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 41 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 423, 426–27 (2017) (discussing the New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation’s decision in relation to other regulatory decisions). 
 84 Islander, 482 F.3d at 79; Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 141 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 85 Letter from John Ferguson to Lynda Schubring, supra note 83, at 14. 
 86 Order Issuing Certificates and Approving Abandonment, 149 FERC ¶ 61,199 (2014); 
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT CONSTITUTION 
PIPELINE AND WRIGHT INTERCONNECT PROJECTS ES-4–ES-5 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov 
/industries/gas/enviro/eis/2014/10-24-14-eis.asp [https://perma.cc/5QKD-RQMM] (scroll to 
the bottom of the page, then click “Constitution FEIS Vol 1 Environmental Analysis PDF”). 
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approved pipeline.87 The Second Circuit rejected this lawsuit, holding that New 
York had acted reasonably.88 The court, however, stated that the company could 
file suit in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals if it believed that New York had 
waived its authority to deny the pipeline by taking so long to deny the 
certificate.89 
Emboldened by its victory in the Second Circuit, in 2017 the state denied a 
Water Quality Certification to the Valley Lateral Pipeline proposal, an eight-
mile long pipeline also designed to transport natural gas from Pennsylvania to 
New York.90 This short interstate pipeline had been approved by FERC in 
2016.91 This time, New York did not rely on water quality arguments—instead 
it premised its decision on the argument that FERC had not done enough to 
assess how the pipeline would lead to more combustion of natural gas from users 
at the end of the pipeline.92 This time, however, FERC acted, ruling that New 
York had taken too long to issue this denial and had thus waived its authority to 
deny the pipeline a Water Quality Certification.93 Barring intervention from 
Congress, the result of lawsuits filed in both these cases will likely determine 
the balance of power in natural gas transport federalism. 
C. The Push for Expanded Environmental Reviews for Energy 
Transport Projects 
In June 2013, President Obama announced a new standard for the Keystone 
XL pipeline, which had been proposed in 2008 to carry oil from Alberta to the 
United States: he would only approve the project if it would not increase oil 
                                                                                                                     
 87 Constitution Pipeline Co. v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87, 90 (2d 
Cir. 2017); Unopposed Motion of Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 
Interstate Nat. Gas Ass’n of Am., American Gas Ass’n, Am. Petroleum Inst., Am. Chemistry 
Council, Nat. Gas Supply Ass’n, Am. Forest & Paper Ass’n, & Process Gas Consumers 
Group for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, Constitution Pipeline v. 
N.Y. Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation 868 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1568); Complaint, 
Constitution Pipeline v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 868 F.3d 87 (2017) (No. 1:16-
cv-00568-NAM-DJS).  
 88 Constitution Pipeline Co,, 868 F.3d at 91. 
 89 Id. at 103. 
 90 Letter from Thomas Berkman, Deputy Comm’r & Gen. Counsel, N.Y. State Dep’t 
of Envtl. Conservation, to Georgia Carter, Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Millennium 
Pipeline Co., & John Zimmer, Mkt. Dir., TRC Envtl. Corp., Valley Lateral Project Notice of 
Decision 2 (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/permits_ej_operations_pdf/valley 
decltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF7Q-VV7A]. 
 91 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Issuing Certificate, 157 FERC ¶ 61,096 
(2016). 
 92 Letter from Thomas Berkman to Georgia Carter & John Zimmer, supra note 90, at 
2. 
 93 Declaratory Order Finding Waiver Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 160 
FERC ¶ 61,065 (2017).  
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production (and thus greenhouse gas emissions) in Canada.94 Ultimately, the 
U.S. State Department, which reviewed the international project, determined 
that the pipeline probably would not increase oil production in Canada, but it 
rejected the pipeline anyway in November 2015 because, it said, the pipeline 
would be “perceived” to increase greenhouse gas emissions.95 Environmental 
groups’ success in holding up the Keystone XL project for almost a decade has 
led to wider efforts to establish a “climate test” for energy transport projects that 
would: (a) quantify upstream and downstream emissions aided by pipelines and 
power transmission and (b) reject projects that would significantly increase 
those emissions.96 
Environmental groups are also pushing the federal government to expand 
environmental reviews of new gas transport—both liquefied natural gas 
facilities and interstate pipelines—to consider how those transport facilities will 
encourage natural gas production and consumption.97 The U.S. government has 
thus far generally declined to consider how new pipelines and liquefied natural 
gas facilities will affect natural gas production and consumption.98 The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has approved eleven of fourteen 
proposed liquefaction facilities and 154 pipeline applications since 2009.99 Yet 
                                                                                                                     
 94 James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental 
Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 122 (2018) 
[hereinafter Coleman, Beyond]. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 123–34. 
 97 See Aaron Flyer, Note, FERC Compliance Under NEPA: FERC’s Obligation to 
Fully Evaluate Upstream and Downstream Environmental Impacts Associated with Siting 
Natural Gas Pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, 27 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 301, 
301 (2015) (arguing that FERC must consider upstream and downstream impacts in natural 
gas pipeline and liquefied natural gas facility approvals); see also Amy Harder, Are Natural-
Gas Exports the Next Keystone?, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/wash 
wire/2014/03/18/are-natural-gas-exports-next-keystone/ [https://perma.cc/VV6T-QNM8] 
(discussing environmentalist opposition to expanded use of natural gas). 
 98 See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 
MODIFICATION 66–67 (Apr. 2013), https://www.cheniere.com/terminals/sabine-pass/trains-
1-6/documentation/ [https://perma.cc/2M6K-BVYT] (assessing potential climate change 
impacts and emissions increases without reference to resulting changes in production and 
consumption); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE SABINE PASS LIQUEFACTION PROJECT 2-99 to 2-100 (Dec. 2011), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EA-1845-FEA-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/97UN-3A2Q] 
(admitting that, currently, there is no standard to determine how incremental contributions 
would translate into physical effects on the environment). FERC has exclusive authority to 
approve or deny siting, construction, and operation of liquefied natural gas facilities. 15 
U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (“The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve 
or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG 
terminal.”). 
 99 The Department of Energy has approved eighteen of these projects and is reviewing 
thirty-eight more. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SUMMARY OF LNG EXPORT APPLICATIONS (Mar. 
2016) http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/Summary%20of%20LNG%20Export 
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FERC has resisted calls to consider the environmental impact of increased 
natural gas production enabled by these new transport facilities.100 Under the 
Obama administration, this led to increasingly high profile interagency conflicts 
with the Environmental Protection Agency, which then believed that FERC 
should provide full reviews of the upstream and downstream impacts of natural 
gas projects.101 And in two recent cases, the D.C. Circuit reached opposite 
decisions on whether FERC must consider the downstream impacts of 
approving natural gas pipelines or liquefied natural gas facilities.102  
It remains to be seen whether environmental groups will have more luck 
with the courts, but on February 3, 2017, an outgoing commissioner of FERC, 
Norman Bay, effectively endorsed these outside arguments for wider 
environmental assessments.103 This argument came in a separate statement to 
an otherwise uncontroversial pipeline approval.104 Commissioner Bay 
continued to insist that NEPA does not require FERC to assess upstream and 
downstream emissions from gas pipelines, noting that “FERC has no authority 
                                                                                                                     
%20Applications.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE39-FCVQ]. 
 100 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra Club v. 
FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and 
Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 137 (2017) (“FERC has consistently maintained that it has no obligation 
to consider greenhouse emissions or any other environmental effects associated with 
upstream and downstream activities in the natural gas production and supply chain.”). In one 
older case, FERC did consider the downstream impact of increased natural gas use, 
concluding that it could be controlled by ensuring transport of low sulfur natural gas for 
combustion. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 101 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Letter on Final Environmental Impact Statement for 
Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC—Leach Xpress Project, and Columbia Gulf Transmission 
LLC—Ryan Xpress Expansion Project to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Oct. 
11, 2016) [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (stating that FERC’s environmental 
review “perpetuates the significant omission” by not considering downstream impact and so 
“[w]e request . . . a headquarters level meeting with us to seek a definitive resolution to this 
matter before you [approve the pipelines] and so that you do not continue to take this 
approach in additional NEPA documents”); U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Letter on 
Comments on the Draft Guidance Manual for Environmental Report Preparation for 
Applications Under the Natural Gas Act to U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(Jan. 19, 2016) [on file with the Ohio State Law Journal] (stating that FERC’s environmental 
reviews of liquefied natural gas terminals must add assessment of “emissions associated with 
the production, transport, and combustion of the natural gas”). FERC’s position has generally 
been supported by the other infrastructure and production approving agencies, such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management. BUREAU OF 
OCEAN & ENERGY MGMT., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM: 
2012-2017, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 8–37 (July 2012) 
(rejecting consideration of upstream and downstream impacts for oil leases). 
 102 Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 867 F.3d 189, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Sierra Club 
v. FERC, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 103 Order Granting Abandonment and Issuing Certificates, 158 FERC ¶ 61,145 (2017). 
 104 Id. 
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to regulate the production of natural gas [because] in general, that authority 
resides with the states.”105 Nevertheless, “in light of the heightened public 
interest and in the interests of good government,” Commissioner Bay said FERC 
should begin studying the impacts of increased upstream emissions and the 
downstream impact of natural gas.106 
D. Objections to Eminent Domain for Energy Transport 
A new front has opened in the energy transport battles, with several lawsuits 
alleging that private companies should not be allowed to use eminent domain to 
acquire easements for their projects.107 Eminent domain allows purchase of 
easements from landowners at fair market value if a deal cannot be reached by 
negotiation.108 It is particularly crucial for linear infrastructure such as roads, 
pipelines, and power-lines because, otherwise, each landowner along the 
proposed route can, in theory, hold out for a higher price to try to capture the 
entire economic value of the project.109  
These unresolved lawsuits have been filed in multiple federal and state 
courts and allege that, under state and federal constitutions, energy transport 
companies may not use eminent domain.110 They rely on multiple theories. 
Some argue that private companies may not use eminent domain without a 
particularly strong government showing of why those companies are operating 
in the public interest.111 Some argue that foreign corporations should not be 
allowed to use eminent domain.112 Some scholars argue that the federal 
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Natural Gas Act, 166 FERC ¶ 61,144 (2019). 
 107 Brief of Amicus Curiae Niskanen Center at 9, Puntenney v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. 17-
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 110 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Downwind, L.L.C. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 2018 WL 3641027 (E.D. Ark. 2017) (No. 3:16-CV-00207), vacated, 2018 
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 111 Berkley Complaint, supra note 107, at 24. 
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government simply was never intended to have the power of eminent domain.113 
And some suggest that the case could be a vehicle for overturning the Supreme 
Court’s controversial decision authorizing eminent domain on behalf of private 
companies in Kelo v. City of New London.114 
If successful, these lawsuits would force energy transport companies to try 
to somehow piece together continuous easement routes from willing 
landowners—any route could be foiled by a single hold out landowner.115 Thus, 
they pose an existential threat to pipelines and power-lines.116 
E. Cross-Cutting Energy Transport Law & Markets Require 
Simultaneous Focus on Both Pipelines and Power-Lines 
The highest profile energy transport battles have been for oil pipelines—
particularly the Keystone XL and Dakota Access Pipelines—and, to a lesser 
extent, natural gas pipelines, such as the Constitution Pipeline.117 
Environmental advocates looking to stop pipelines have advocated for each of 
the changes suggested above: overlapping federal and state reviews, expanded 
environmental assessments, and restricted use of eminent domain.118 But 
focusing too intently on oil pipelines can obscure the ways that these changes to 
the approval process will also affect the other energy transport projects that the 
United States needs to move toward a cleaner energy transport system.119 First, 
each of these procedures may have a serious impact on approving new power 
transmission. Second, aligning energy transport procedures could enable a 
transition to cleaner energy because the current system is stacked in favor of 
fossil fuel transport.  
Each of the new hurdles advocated for oil pipelines poses a serious risk of 
tripping up power-line projects as well. For example, a new federal commitment 
                                                                                                                     
 113 See, e.g., William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE 
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 118 See supra Parts III.B–D. 
 119 And, of course, policymakers should be wary of adopting procedural suggestions 
from groups whose substantive goals are to prevent any future approvals. Similarly, it would 
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to do full environmental and cultural review of interstate energy transport 
projects, like the Dakota Access pipeline, would also require federal review of 
interstate power transmission projects. So power-lines and oil pipelines would 
both be subjected to two levels of review, requiring approvals from all state 
regulators as well as the federal government. And decisions to limit the use of 
eminent domain by private companies would impact power transmission as 
well. In fact, the impact would likely be more severe because landowners have 
traditionally been warier of granting easements for power lines than pipelines, 
because pipelines, once buried in the ground, are invisible.120  
Similarly, if upstream and downstream reviews gain traction in the courts, 
it may increase uncertainty for power-line proposals as well. Of course, power-
lines for renewable power transmission have many beneficial downstream 
impacts, such as reducing emissions from fossil fuel plants.121 Indeed, FERC 
has mandated that when states make transmission decisions they must consider 
how their decisions will impact the ability of neighboring states to meet their 
renewable targets.122  
But there is no reason to think that electric transmission will be uniquely 
immune from the uncertainties and delay caused by expanded and uncertain 
environmental assessments. First of all, power transmission has historically 
attracted more opposition than oil and gas pipelines because transmission is 
above the ground, leaving a permanent eyesore.123 Second, the renewable 
projects themselves often attract local opposition driven by the effects of large 
solar and wind facilities on sensitive species, local land-use, and aesthetic 
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values.124 These opponents of wind and solar projects will use the same tactics 
employed in pipeline debates: even a project that has received site approvals 
will never be built if it cannot connect to centers of demand. With an expanded 
environmental impact assessment, the transmission approval process will 
provide another opportunity to re-litigate familiar disputes that wind turbines 
endanger bird populations and damage scenic vistas or that solar farms have 
impacts on water use, land use, and endangered species.  
Transmission opponents can and will add arguments that all the downstream 
economic activity that is served by electricity has negative impacts on the 
environment or that the power transmission, which is open to all users, will be 
diverted to serve fossil fuel power plants.125 And the arguments for considering 
upstream and downstream consequences of electricity transmission are, if 
anything, more reasonable than the same case for oil pipelines: oil can go by 
rail, ship, or pipeline, but electric power can only go by transmission lines. Thus, 
renewable power is, if anything, more vulnerable than oil pipelines to delay-by-
environmental-review tactics. And so it has proved. When investors proposed 
the “Northern Pass” power line to take hydropower from Canada to 
Massachusetts, opponents objected that helping Canadian hydropower 
endangered fish populations in Canada.126 This strategy was ultimately 
successful when New Hampshire rejected the power-line in February 2018.127  
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Similarly, eminent domain arguments against oil pipelines are being used 
effectively against power lines for renewables as well.128 Resisting eminent 
domain was another key strategy of the successful opposition to the Northern 
Pass power-line.129 And in Missouri, opponents have been able to repeatedly 
delay construction of a power-line designed to carry wind-energy to the 
Midwest.130 Thus, while oil pipelines grab the national headlines, power-lines 
across the country are being held up using the same legal arguments. 
Finally, focusing on energy transport as a whole, aligning energy transport 
procedures could be a very effective means of encouraging a transition to a 
cleaner energy system because the combination of market realities and current 
procedures favor fossil fuels. The irony of focusing on oil pipeline transport is 
that it is the least important link in the energy transport chain: whether or not oil 
pipelines are built, oil will typically get to market because oil can be easily 
moved by rail, barge, or truck. Natural gas and electricity, by contrast, can only 
be moved with large-scale projects, such as pipelines, liquefaction facilities, and 
power lines.131 So if new procedures raise the cost of power lines and gas 
pipelines, that will raise the cost of moving to a system that relies more on gas 
and renewable power and less on easily transportable commodities such as oil 
and coal.  
Furthermore, as between natural gas and power, current procedures are 
more favorable to gas transport because, New York notwithstanding, interstate 
gas pipelines generally only need a single federal permit.132 By contrast, 
interstate power lines must receive a permit from each state they cross. Utilities 
must often consider whether to burn more natural gas near its source and 
transmit power where it is needed or, in the alternative, to transport the natural 
gas to where power is needed and burn it locally. Under the current divided 
regulatory system, it is easier to get approval for an interstate gas pipeline than 
an interstate power line, so utilities tend to transport the gas. But to move to a 
renewable energy future, it would make more sense to build an interstate power 
line that could be used to transport power from all sources: not just gas power 
plants, but also new wind turbines and solar panels. Thus, our divided system 
for approving energy transport actively pushes companies into environmentally 
counter-productive investments. Proponents of a cleaner energy system have 
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more to gain from considering energy transport methods together and aligning 
them, rather than by attacking the system piece-meal. 
IV. HOW POLICY UNCERTAINTY IMPACTS INVESTMENT IN ENERGY 
TRANSPORT 
Investors in energy transport projects demand a rate of return that 
compensates them for both the cost of the project and the danger that the project 
will be delayed or canceled.133 As uncertainty increases due to expanded 
reviews of these projects, investors will charge more to transport fuel and 
electricity. Thus, energy consumers and producers will end up paying the costs 
imposed by expanded reviews.134 And each of these trends is exacerbated in 
restructured or “deregulated” markets where investors have no guarantee of 
getting their money back.135 
Given their regulatory complexity, companies developing interstate energy 
projects already demand higher rates of return than they would receive for a 
typical intrastate project.136 As states and the federal government add further 
overlapping reviews, as environmental assessments are expanded, and as more 
landowners challenge the use of eminent domain for energy transport projects, 
investors will demand even higher rate of returns. 
Higher rates of return will raise the cost consumers pay to achieve the 
promise of an energy transition enabled by affordable new production of wind 
and gas power.137 One consistent theme of literature on the cost of transitioning 
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to these power sources is that it would be minimized by creating regulatory 
certainty.138  
Apart from making energy transport more expensive, on the margin, 
expanded reviews will also make some energy transport projects not worth 
pursuing. This too has costs. There are the economic costs to consumers who 
are unable to purchase cheaper power and fuel and to the producers who cannot 
serve them. But there are other costs.  
There are environmental costs: unable to access cheaper and cleaner sources 
like wind power and natural gas, power producers are stuck with older, dirtier 
sources like oil and coal. For example, there are not enough gas pipelines to 
New England to serve all of its heating and power needs in severe cold 
weather.139 Although Pennsylvania is flooded with some of the cheapest gas in 
the world, New England’s inadequate pipeline access meant it had the most 
expensive natural gas in the world during the December 2017 cold snap.140 As 
a result, power producers switched to the very dirtiest sources of power, coal 
and oil, leaving New England with high power prices and polluted air.141  
And there are costs for our nation’s energy security as well. In late January 
2018, New England was forced to import liquefied natural gas from Russia to 
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supplement its poor pipeline access.142 The gas came from a company 
sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department but was available for use in the 
United States because it had been first purchased by French intermediaries.143 
Thus, while U.S. producers were forced to sell their natural gas at the mid-
continent’s bargain prices, sanctioned Russian companies received a premium 
price from gas-starved New England consumers. 
V. PRINCIPLES TO ENABLE THE ENERGY FUTURE 
To attract investment in a new energy economy, the United States will need 
procedures that can accommodate increased interest in energy transport 
decisions while, at the same time, providing certainty to energy transport 
investors. This section suggests four reforms that could accomplish these twin 
goals. First, energy transport approvals should invite wider consultation with 
affected parties while, at the same time, ultimately placing decision-making 
authority in one level of government. Second, if approval processes are to be 
reformed, that reform should generally be prospective only, not impacting 
projects already in the review pipeline. Third, further deadlines for 
environmental reviews and approvals should be used to motivate prompt action 
from agency decision-makers. Fourth, judicial review of projects under the 
National Environmental Policy Act should be streamlined and subject to time 
limits that address the worst delays. Fifth, the government should sponsor more 
studies of key nationwide issues—such as the environmental impact of 
particular fuels or the long-term effects of increased fossil fuel infrastructure—
that otherwise may derail individual approval processes. 
A. Wide Consultation, One Decision-Maker 
Governments should make increased provision for wide participation in 
approvals of energy infrastructure, but energy transport projects should only 
require approval from federal regulators or state regulators—not both. 
Whichever regulators are chosen to make this final decision should facilitate 
input from all levels of government. Stakeholder interest in the global energy 
industry, both within and beyond their jurisdiction, is appropriate because 
carbon emissions from the energy industry affect all parts of the globe.144 
Consumer interest in energy supply chains is here to stay.  
At the same time, ultimate decision-making authority on energy projects 
should, to the extent possible, be centralized. It is natural that stakeholders who 
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do not get their way at one level of government should seek to re-litigate the 
issue at another level. But overlapping decision-makers is a recipe for 
uncertainty. And there is no reason to think that subjecting each proposed 
project to multiple veto gates would improve overall economic and 
environmental results.145 Multiple veto gates just mean more opportunities to 
kill proposed investments—and that is true whether those investments are in oil, 
gas, or renewable power transport.  
Congress should pass legislation to give the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission authority to approve all modes of interstate energy transport: both 
power-lines and pipelines, whether they are transporting oil, gas, or power. In 
effect, this would expand the system that is currently in place for natural gas 
pipelines to oil pipelines and power lines. At the same time, Congress should 
explicitly give FERC authority, in consultation with the Environmental 
Protection Agency, to grant any permits or pre-empt any state or local laws, as 
necessary, to complete construction of these federally-approved interstate 
projects. There is no need to transfer all permit granting authority to the federal 
agency—instead, FERC could merely step in when a necessary water quality 
certification or other permit is unreasonably denied or delayed.146 
Canada’s traditional system of energy regulation may be a helpful model 
here. Canada has traditionally left regulation of energy production (and, to an 
extent, local pollution) to each province’s sole authority, which is similar to the 
traditional approach in the United States.147 But interprovincial energy transport 
issues, by contrast, are for the Canadian federal government to decide; provinces 
have input through the principle of cooperative federalism,148 but cannot veto—
or even “frustrate” interprovincial projects.149 Although this system is being 
seriously stressed by Canadian oil pipeline politics today, this overall system 
allows for wide participation in energy decision-making but ensures that each 
issue is ultimately decided by a single responsible government.150 
Current controversies in Canada also provide examples of how the federal 
government can ensure that subnational governments grant the necessary 
permits for nation-wide infrastructure—avoiding the New York Constitution 
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Pipeline scenario.151 In 2016, Kinder Morgan won federal approval to expand 
its Trans Mountain pipeline, which runs West from oil fields in the province of 
Alberta across the province of British Columbia to the port of Vancouver.152 
The pipeline, however, is quite controversial in British Columbia.153 In fact, 
British Columbia’s ruling coalition is formed by two parties who joined forces 
in the province’s legislative assembly based on an agreement to “[i]mmediately 
employ every tool available to the new government to stop the [federally-
approved] expansion of the Kinder Morgan pipeline.”154 In practice, this has 
meant that the provincial government and local governments have slow-walked 
and denied permits to Kinder Morgan as it attempts to complete expansion of 
the pipeline.155 
In response, the federal government has developed an expedited procedure 
for excusing compliance with provincial and local ordinances that hold up 
pipeline construction.156 It has already employed this authority to invalidate 
various local roadblocks for the Trans Mountain pipeline such as plan approvals 
and tree cutting permits that Kinder Morgan had sought to complete its 
construction.157  
Every national project requires numerous local permits: permits to cross 
local water bodies, permits to shut down roads to bring in heavy equipment, 
permits to deviate from local zoning requirements, permits for noisy 
equipment.158 Groups that are unhappy with national approvals of national 
infrastructure can use each of these permitting decisions as veto gates to 
frustrate national policies.159 Congress should give sufficient authority to FERC 
to ensure that national policy is implemented. 
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If, alternatively, the federal government chooses to maintain the current 
division between federal approval of natural gas pipelines and state-by-state 
approval of oil pipelines and power lines, it should assure that only one level of 
review is required: either federal or state. Thus, on one hand, federal reviews of 
interstate natural gas pipelines should be supplemented with federal authority to 
waive state requirements holding up those pipelines. And on the other hand, the 
federal government should refrain from imposing environmental reviews on 
power lines and oil pipelines, which are reviewed by the states. 
B. Changes to Approval Process Should Be Prospective Only 
To the extent possible, changes to the rules of environmental review and the 
standards for approval should be implemented only prospectively, so that the 
goalposts are not moved half-way through the review process. This would allow 
continued improvement in environmental assessment while providing a measure 
of certainty to investors in interstate energy transport.160  
For example, scientists continue to improve techniques for assessing the 
“life cycle” impacts of energy production; these assessments show the net 
impact of a fuel over its full cycle from production to transport to 
consumption.161 These techniques can be helpful to answer general questions 
about fuel such as: When you consider the land used by corn, does ethanol really 
cause less greenhouse gas emissions than gasoline? Or when you consider the 
power plants that provide electricity, do electric cars cause less greenhouse gas 
emissions than gasoline vehicles?162 
These techniques, however, do not yet provide resolution to determine 
whether a single energy transport project will raise or lower global greenhouse 
gas emissions163 (and may never be able to provide this resolution). 
Governments should continue attempting to improve this method of 
environmental assessment but should not impose it as part of existing reviews. 
Developing experimental methods of study within an environmental review 
process simply imposes too much delay and uncertainty on the environmental 
review process. 
Judicial review of environmental reviews have a natural tendency to change 
the rules midstream because judicial review is inherently backward-looking. 
When a judge holds that a long-standing environmental review practice does not 
                                                                                                                     
 160 In fact, this change would remove one current disincentive for improving 
environmental review procedures: reformers would no longer have to worry about sending 
current projects back to square one. See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 201–06 (2014) (evaluating the importance of timing when 
considering regulatory decisions and interventions). 
 161 See JAMES COLEMAN ET AL., CAN. INST. RES. L., OCCASIONAL PAPER #49, 
CALIBRATING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS EXPORT LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS: ACCOUNTING FOR 
LEGAL BOUNDARIES AND POST-EXPORT MARKETS 1 (May 2015).  
 162 See Coleman & Jordaan, supra note 19, at 2.  
 163 Coleman, Beyond, supra note 94, at 142–45. 
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comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, she holds that review 
invalid. She cannot make her ruling prospective only.164 This makes the 
National Environmental Policy Act a particularly dangerous tool to energy 
transport investors who would like to be able to rely on a federal approval once 
it is given. This problem is particularly vexing because NEPA does not include 
a statute of limitations; NEPA actions are only limited by the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s six-year statute of limitations.165 In theory then, a power line 
or pipeline that received approval and was built in 2018 could lose its 
authorization to operate due to a suit filed in 2024 (and potentially resolved 
years later).166 
Thus, aggressive judicial expansion of environmental reviews is a unique 
danger to energy transport investment. To combat this, reviewing courts should 
take two steps. First, courts should be wary of reading new procedural 
requirements into environmental reviews. Time and time again, the Supreme 
Court has unanimously reversed lower courts that demanded expanded 
environmental reviews.167 In fact, the Supreme Court has never held that a 
NEPA review was insufficient.168 The average NEPA review now takes five 
years to complete and even a finding of no significant impact—a finding that a 
full NEPA review is not necessary—can cover 1,200 pages.169 Any court can 
find imperfect reasoning in such a gargantuan document, but courts must give 
more weight to both the imperative of speeding reviews and the consistent 
                                                                                                                     
 164 Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96 (1993) (“[A] rule of federal law, 
once announced and applied to the parties in controversy, must be given full retroactive 
effect by all courts adjudicating federal law.”). For the split rationale that the Court used to 
reach this conclusion, see James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) 
(Souter, J., opinion of the court) (judicial decisions are “overwhelmingly” “fully retroactive, 
applying both to parties before the court and to all other by and against whom claims may 
be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statute of 
limitations”); id. at 546–47 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that judicial rulings may 
sometimes be prospective because judges sometimes “make” law); id. at 549 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“[J]udges in a real sense ‘make’ law. But they make it as judges make it, which 
is to say as though they were ‘finding’ it––discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing 
what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 165 Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 1997).  
 166 If the government believed it was prejudiced by the delay, it could attempt to argue 
that the decision was protected by the doctrine of laches. See id. at 631. Of course, the 
government defending the permitting decision could be an entirely different government than 
the one that made the initial decision, and might have an entirely different energy policy. 
 167 Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act in the U.S. Supreme Court: 
A Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtains, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507, 1507 (2012) (“The 
Supreme Court has decided seventeen cases arising under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) and the government has not only won every case, but won almost all of them 
unanimously.”). 
 168 Id.  
 169 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 73. 
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guidance of the Supreme Court that NEPA does not impose any procedures 
beyond those “stated in the plain language of the Act.”170 
Second, although courts cannot make their civil rulings prospective-only, 
they can limit the practical impact of striking down an environmental review by 
allowing the project proponent to continue building and operating its facility 
while the federal agency supplements its environmental review.171 The energy 
company building a power line or pipeline should be allowed to take the risk 
that the federal agency might change its views after completing the 
supplemental review ordered by the court. In most cases, by the time a court 
rules that the government should have considered a question more carefully, the 
government will already have asserted that it would have reached the same 
decision in any event. Thus, in the run of the mill case, the government’s 
supplemental court-ordered environmental review is exceedingly unlikely to 
change its ultimate decision on an energy transport project. To avoid needless 
delay, project proponents should be allowed to continue building their project 
at their own risk.172 
Finally, if courts do not moderate their demands for ever-lengthier 
environmental reviews, Congress should step in to restore a balance between 
making reviews more predictable and timelier while maintaining their rigor. An 
amendment to NEPA would be an imprecise tool for accomplishing this 
balance, but if necessary, Congress could raise the bar for winning a preliminary 
injunction under NEPA or codify further deference to agency decisions. As 
explained below, a more radical step would simply immunize from review any 
project that had languished in the approval process for more than six years.  
C. Deadlines for Environmental Reviews 
Congress should mandate, and federal agencies should implement, faster 
deadlines for environmental reviews of energy transport projects. The average 
federal environmental impact statement currently takes five years to prepare.173 
These delays make it impossible for U.S. companies to respond nimbly to the 
                                                                                                                     
 170 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 
(1978). In other words, courts should take more seriously their oft-stated commitment not to 
“flyspeck” a weighty environmental review. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. 
Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. 
Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988). 
 171 Ellen M. Gilmer, Sabal Trail Permits ‘Defective and Unlawful’ — Enviros, E&E 
NEWS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060074237 [https://perma.cc/6HHE 
-A6N8]; Ellen M. Gilmer, Shutdown Day for Southeast Pipeline? All Eyes on the Court, 
E&E NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060073089 [perma.cc/3YKF-
SD8B]. 
 172 This is effectively what the district court allowed in the Dakota Access case. See 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 282 F. Supp. 3d 91, 109 (D.D.C. 
2017).  
 173 See infra notes 175–177. 
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shifting geography of energy supply and demand.174 And they are not necessary 
to protect the environment; Canada, a nation that is arguably on the cutting edge 
of environmental assessment practice, has recently proposed expanding the 
scope of its environmental reviews and completing them in a maximum of 300 
days—less than a year.175 There is simply no reason that a careful environmental 
review should take half a decade to complete. 
The NEPA environmental impact statement process has always been slow 
and is getting slower. A ten-year 2008 study found that the average NEPA 
review took 3.4 years and that this average time period was growing over 
time.176 A 2015 Department of Energy study found that the average NEPA 
review took over 4 years,177 and a 2016 review by the National Association of 
Environmental Professionals found that the average review took 5.1 years to 
complete.178 Some reviews last much more than a decade.179  
These timelines slow U.S. companies trying to keep pace with changes in 
the geography of energy supply and demand. Consider how energy markets can 
change in four years: 
 
x In 2008, the U.S. Energy Information Administration projected that 
the United States would have 30 Gigawatts of wind power 
generation by 2015 and just 140 Megawatts of solar photovoltaic 
power.180  
 
x In 2012, the United States already had installed over 39 Gigawatts 
of wind power and 380 Megawatts of solar photovoltaic and was 
                                                                                                                     
 174 See infra footnotes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
 175 A Proposed New Impact Assessment System, GOV’T OF CAN. (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmental-
reviews/environmental-assessment-processes.html [https://perma.cc/VJH8-LJF8]  
(describing proposal). The very largest projects would be allowed double the time, 1.6 years, 
which is still less than a third of the average time for a U.S. review. See infra notes 175–177. 
 176 Piet deWitt & Carole A. deWitt, How Long Does It Take to Prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement?, 10 ENVTL. PRAC. 164, 164 (2008). 
 177 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ISSUE NO. 86, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
(NEPA) LESSONS LEARNED QUARTERLY REPORT 11 (Mar. 2016), https://www.energy.gov 
/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/LLQR-March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXG6-YP87]. A 
2014 study from the U.S. Government Accountability found that the average time for a 
NEPA review was 4.6 years. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-369, NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA ANALYSES 13 (Apr. 
2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662543.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q559-QM2Z]. 
 178 NAEP Annual National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Report for 2016, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF ENVTL PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 2017) http://www.naep.org/nepa-2016-annual-report 
[https://perma.cc/73X8-NSK3].  
 179 deWitt & deWitt, supra note 176, at 165.  
 180 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008 142 (June 2008)  
[hereinafter EIA OUTLOOK 2008] https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo08/pdf/03 
83(2008).pdf [https://perma.cc/U5J6-G4TD]. 
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projected to have 54 Gigawatts of wind power and 2,000 Megawatts 
of solar photovoltaic power installed by 2015.181 
 
x In 2008, the United States, faced with high natural gas prices, was 
building multi-billion-dollar terminals to import liquefied natural 
gas from countries across the world.182  
 
x In 2012, the United States, benefiting from massive new production 
of natural gas was looking forward to years of low prices and a 
future as a liquefied natural gas exporter.183 
 
x In 2010, U.S. oil production had fallen for four decades and stood 
at 5.5 million barrels per day of oil.184 Meanwhile, the country 
imported 9.4 million barrels of petroleum products per day.185  
 
x By 2014, U.S. oil production had spiked to 8.8 million barrels per 
day and net imports had fallen to 5.1 million barrels per day.186 
 
The need to shorten the absurd time frames now required to complete 
environmental reviews is one of the few areas of bipartisan agreement in 
investment and infrastructure policies.187 Several initiatives have been taken to 
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try to shorten these reviews.188 But these initiatives have not been sufficient—
reviews still get longer every year.189 
Congress could go further and impose deadlines on environmental reviews. 
In other areas, agencies have been able to implement timelines for drug 
approvals.190 Two keys to this have been industry funding and agreed timelines 
for review.191 And the experience of countries like Canada suggests that much 
shorter deadlines—less than a year in all but the most complex cases—are 
workable for environmental reviews.192 At a minimum, Congress should 
mandate that all environmental reviews be completed in less than two years and 
give responsible agencies financial incentives to meet these deadlines.  
The most frequent criticism of such efforts is that they will lead to rushed 
environmental reviews that are even more vulnerable to being invalidated by the 
courts.193 But this criticism is misplaced and likely mistaken. It is misplaced 
because if compliant environmental review under the National Environmental 
Policy Act unavoidably requires five years then the Act, or its interpretation, 
must be changed. And it is likely mistaken because if all reviews are 
accomplished in a timelier fashion, it would likely change expectations of what 
is feasible in a review: it is doubtful whether judges will expect agencies to 
complete five years of work in two years. 
                                                                                                                     
prepare an EIS ranged from 51 days to 6,708 days (18.4 years). The average time for all 
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D. Speeding Judicial Review Under the National Environmental Policy 
Act 
Even when environmental reviews have been concluded, investors cannot 
count on completing their project—they can get caught in years of litigation 
over the adequacy of this review. Every year, about 100 projects are challenged 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, and more than half of these claims 
are filed in district courts within the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.194 Investors must count on the government to defend their permit, 
particularly in the Ninth Circuit where project proponents have often not even 
been allowed to help the government defend their permit in court.195 
Plaintiffs challenging these environmental reviews enjoy average-to-above-
average success rates, and even if a company’s permit survives district court 
review, it can be invalidated in the Court of Appeals.196 In theory, the 
government could appeal a loss to the Supreme Court, but the Court has only 
taken seventeen NEPA cases in the half century that the law has operated.197 
Each time the Supreme Court has taken a case, the government has won; indeed 
almost all of these decisions have been unanimous and several rebuked the 
lower courts for requiring too much of government environmental reviews.198  
But government agencies cannot count on the Supreme Court to rein in the 
lower courts—the Supreme Court simply takes too few cases.199 So if the 
government wants to ensure that its environmental reviews will stand—that its 
half decade of environmental analysis is not struck down—it may gild the lily, 
doing more and more review to avoid a loss in court. And investors look at this 
process and see they will have to wait over five years for their review and, even 
when that is done, may be stuck in years of further litigation.200 
To streamline these reviews, Congress should take two steps. First, NEPA 
challenges to FERC approvals of natural gas projects already receive expedited 
review starting in the Courts of Appeals: either the D.C. Circuit or the Circuit 
where the company’s headquarters is located.201 All energy projects, including 
                                                                                                                     
 194 David E. Adelman & Robert L. Glicksman, Presidential and Judicial Politics in 
Environmental Litigation, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7–8 (2018). 
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solar farms on federal land, and power-lines to support those projects, should 
receive expedited review in the D.C. Circuit.202  
Second, when a company is forced to wait an unreasonable length of time 
for a permit, that permit should eventually be immunized from invalidation 
under NEPA. After all, if a government issues an environmental impact 
statement and permit six years after a project is proposed, what is the benefit of 
allowing judicial review of that environmental impact statement? The 
environmental review took six years. If a court believes that is still not enough 
review, what more would it like: twelve years of review?  
And if the government’s review is still truly inadequate after six years, why 
should the private company building the project be punished further? If the 
government had wanted to, it could have denied the permit at any time in the 
preceding six years. If it remained committed to the project through multiple 
administrations and successive congresses, what practical purpose is achieved 
by further delay? 
If NEPA review was precluded after some interval—whether six years, 
eight years, or ten—the government would still have an incentive to issue timely 
reviews.203 Project proponents do not want to wait six years for a permit—they 
would like their reviews and permitting completed within one or two years. But 
a time limit would solve the worst cases of delay and address investors’ worst 
fears. 
                                                                                                                     
 202 See, e.g., Sherwood v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 842 F.3d 400, 402 (6th Cir. 2016) (power 
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E. Wider Study of Cross-Cutting Issues 
There are some cross-cutting issues that tend to arise in multiple individual 
permitting decisions. For instance: What is the impact of wind power on avian 
populations? What is the life-cycle impact of natural gas or oil produced by 
fracking? What level of natural gas infrastructure would be compatible with 
meeting U.S. climate goals? These are important questions that cannot be fully 
resolved in individual permitting decisions. The federal government should 
invest in studies that carefully address these questions on a nationwide level and 
are designed to be used in individual permitting decisions. 
For instance, if an agency like FERC did a careful study of what level of 
fossil fuel pipeline infrastructure build-out would likely be built if the country 
adopted an optimal carbon tax, or if the nation met its current greenhouse gas 
reduction goals, that study could be a relevant consideration in pipeline and 
transmission approvals. Giving due credit to the distributed knowledge reflected 
by markets,204 if the pipeline build out was faster than anticipated, that could 
signal either (1) that the previous studies, like so many energy studies, had failed 
to predict market developments, (2) that new pipelines should not be approved, 
or (3) that the country was not willing to abide by the strict limits reflected in 
theoretical commitments to price carbon or reduce emissions.  
Thus, these studies, unlike assessments of individual infrastructure, would 
be able to provide useful information because they would take advantage of 
existing life-cycle analyses’s focus on large scale markets where more 
information may be a public good because of its wide benefits, rather than the 
project-level decisions that are better studied by individual companies with 
money on the line.205 Again, these studies would likely not be a determinative 
factor in any review: inconsistencies between the study and infrastructure 
investment would be more likely to result from the study’s necessary generality 
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on the assumption that carbon will be priced in the future. See Feike Sijbesma, Running the 
Race Together, 2017-2018 CARBON PRICING LEADERSHIP COALITION REPORT 6 (2018), 
https://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/carbon-pricing-leadership-report 
[https://perma.cc/CN5V-A83P]; EXXONMOBIL, ENERGY & CARBON–MANAGING THE RISKS 
17 (2009), https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/energy-and-environment/ 
report---energy-and-carbon---managing-the-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SKT-7R9R]  
(planning for carbon prices ranging from $20/ton to above $40/ton); Letter to Shareholders, 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 2 (May 16, 2014), https://www.shell.com/investors/environmental-
social-and-governance/sri-news-presentations-and-annual-briefings/_jcr_content/par/tab 
bedcontent/tab_667142067/textimage_1262076677.stream/1519763050501/9fac753c6798
5b2e3b7e123534a1c27c97ab400ca35647b4271b2ed5342be6c3/sri-web-response-climate-
change-may14.pdf [https://perma.cc/V582-DYTN].  
2019] PIPELINES & POWER-LINES 307 
and forward looking nature. But, over time, they could be calibrated to improve 
the country’s energy transport infrastructure forecasting.206 
VI. CONCLUSION  
For a century the United States has relied on two principle sources of 
energy: coal for electricity and oil for transport. Coal and oil are cheap and easy 
to transport, crisscrossing the country every day by rail, barge, pipeline, truck, 
and tanker. But they come at an environmental cost: burning these fossil fuels 
pollutes the air that we breathe and warms the globe.  
The United States now has a golden opportunity to transition to cleaner 
sources of energy, with more and more transportation powered by electricity, 
and more electricity powered by natural gas and renewables. And new 
technology has suddenly made these energy sources even cheaper than other 
fuels in much of the country. 
But there is a catch: gas and power are much, much more expensive to 
transport to energy users across the United States. Without massive new 
investments in energy transport, these resources will largely go to waste. And, 
at the same moment, energy transport infrastructure has grown more 
controversial due to a complex mix of environmental concerns, state and federal 
jockeying for power, and landowner concerns. 
Congress and the courts must provide energy transport investors with a 
stable, predictable, and timely process to build the pipelines and power-lines 
that can build a cleaner energy future. By working together investors and 
policymakers can ensure that the United States reaps the full environmental, 
economic, and security benefits of its new energy boom. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 206 Thus far, the United States has made little systematic effort to identify these issues 
or produce studies designed to enable individual permitting decisions. For example, in its 
recent guidance on considering greenhouse gas emissions in National Environmental Policy 
Act decisions the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality suggested reliance on the 
Department of Energy’s study of the climate impact of liquefied natural gas exports. 
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND 
AGENCIES ON CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REVIEWS 16 (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/08/f33/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74LY-Q4QT]. But that study only compared gas exports to other fossil 
fuels such as coal. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB. (NETL), LIFE CYCLE 
GREENHOUSE GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM UNITED 
STATES 18 (May 2014). 
 
